To the utter despair of materialist historians, existence (a subtle philosophical French concept, which would probably translate into Rightist English as values) keeps preceding essence: we are not only what we are, but also – and, at some turning points of history, predominantly – what we fancy to be.
Looking at what we are: as a Frenchman living in Hungary, I have to say that objective anthropological differences between the indigenous populations of both countries are laughably small. In both countries, the once-dominant Christian faith is now de facto cultural nostalgia, a kind of quaint folklore to go along with dinner during traditional holidays. In rural Hungary, you can expect a few more shops to be closed on Sundays. Otherwise, on both sides, we have late and rather sterile marriages, a high divorce rate, and growing social atomization.
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, however, dares to mention Christianity as a defining element of Hungarian and European identity, while the new, made-in-Washington hope of French conservatives, Marion Maréchal Le Pen, in her AIPAC-approved brand of pseudo-nationalism reduced to an Islamophobic discourse, prefers, as her Aunt Marine already did, to speak about laicity (another typically French code name for deeply anti-Christian, “Republican” ideas) – while her own grandfather, Jean-Marie Le Pen, himself a well-known lecher and atheist, would still dare to mention the Christian faith.
In 1990, many Hungarians did not even know to which religion their family belonged, let alone which denomination (in the case of Christians). Viktor Orbán, who probably knew that his family was, somehow, Calvinist, was however no exception to this rule: his FIDESZ party was by then full of retarded heirs of the May 1968 cultural revolution, exhibiting metrosexual hairstyles, advocating the legalization of drugs, and consistently snubbing the historical churches of Hungary in the political debate. No wonder Uncle Soros liked them so much back then. Viktor Orbán’s present-day attitude, both politically and in his (not so) private life (married to the same woman for the last thirty years, a father of five, and a churchgoer) would thus deserve – if anything in this world does – to be called “neoconservative,” since it is not an inherited cultural feature.
For the same reasons, the problem with the latest – and most glamorous – “Marion” release of the Le Pen brand is not so much that, as the daughter of a shady French network-artist with proven Mossad links, she does not live with the father of her child, and, judging by her elocution, spends – like her aunt – much more time in discos than in libraries. The issue is that even her self-representation through political discourse clearly shows that she cannot see anything wrong in her deeply unchristian and postmodern way of life, which is problematic even by Clintonian PR standards.
Obviously, even putting a brutal end to extra-European immigration (which Marion does not really want to do, since she and her aunt do not really push for Frexit, and must know that the sacrosanct “mobility of persons” is baked into the cake of the European treaties), though a highly desirable move, would not reverse the negative population growth of native Europeans, since this demographic shipwreck (in spite of the “migrant rape” rhetoric in which even Orbán himself indulges from time to time) is not the result of the migrant invasion, but rather of the attitude of selfish, narcissistic, and morally under-educated Western women, well represented as such by the unrepentant Marion herself.
Though never thoroughly convinced by Islam, the Ottoman Turks did not only use it as a geopolitical tool. Casanova reports in his Memoires that, while residing in Istanbul, they constantly tried to convert him. And, lo and behold, Casanova the lecher, the Mason, the progressive, had both sentimental and theological arguments to support his refusal: back then, though “Europe” was still more of a geographical notion than the kind of makeshift ideal it later became, concepts such as the divinity of Christ were part and parcel of the culture of educated Europeans (to accept or refute it – but, in both cases, knowing what they were talking about). Whereas “Western conservatives” (who can only conserve what they objectively still have: the May 1968 anti-authoritarian Kool-Aid cult) are as representative of the Christian tradition as Soros’ cosmopolitan migrant army of smartphone-addicted, porn-intoxicated, unrooted consumers is representative of Islamic tradition, some political movements in the East (such as those around Putin and Orbán) could give us hope that they might eventually fake it till they make it.
Though personally sharing this hope as an instinctual self-preservation attitude, as an analyst I have to say that it has many illusory aspects. As nice as the “Russian interference” narrative might sound to the ears of my Eurasianist friends, let’s be honest: whether you like it or not, there is no such thing. Of the two competing and contradictory lies of neocon war propaganda against Russia (the “gas station posturing as a state” and the omnipresent, omnipotent Russian Devil), in foreign policy, the first seems to stand closer to the truth: Russia does not ideologically influence political movements in the West, because in order to be able to do so Russia would first have to sort out what kind of state ideology it itself has – which has not been done at any point in the existence of Putin’s regime. As a consequence, Russia acts as a conservative and stingy investor in the Western political stock markets, basically buying shares in any make-believe “conservative” start-up going public on the Washington, Paris, or Berlin exchanges – including AIPAC-approved Marion and the LGBT-friendly AfD – encouraging Islamophobic demagogy in the West while simultaneously disappointing centuries-old Christian allies (such as Armenia) in the Caucasus, as a side-effect of a perilous diplomatic poker game with the neo-Ottoman capo di tutti capi in Ankara and his Azerbaijani stooges.
Now, don’t get me wrong: I personally think that Lavrov is the best living diplomat on Planet Earth. But even Lavrov cannot possibly promote an agenda which does not exist in the minds of the Russian elites – who, due to their chronic lack of any consistent self-image, enjoy and mimic the most moronic Russophobic clichés mass-produced about them by Hollywood, and seemingly hire Pussy Riot cartoonists to stage the pro-Putin electoral message. Russia’s resistance to globalism is pure inertia, which a more effective (i.e., less hostile) campaign of Western cognitive warfare might neutralize in a matter of years. Fortunately, the so-called elites of the West, excepting a few dinosaurs like Kissinger, are by now too degenerate and stupid to be able to understand the not-very-complicated mentality of the Russian people.
Alongside sheer stupidity, however, this enormous tactical mistake is also based on a deep ideological need of the dying West: the need for an enemy, of the phantom-like presence of Evil in a world which should simultaneously be made axiologically neutral. In Rousseau’s world, which is now even the de facto horizon of the new gurus of the “Right” (such as Jordan Peterson), human nature is so benign that violence can only be explained as a consequence of ideology. Of course, nobody cares to explain what kind of “ideology” could motivate the Dayak hunter-gatherer mountaineers of Borneo, only a few decades ago, to slice to pieces a significant part of the agricultural population that was settled in the coastal area by the unified Indonesian state.
As the subtle transition from anti-Communism to anti-fascism undertaken by Western Russophobic discourse clearly shows – disregarding the hard feelings of a few vengeful Trotskyites – the Western hostility towards Russia (e.g., the need for “containment” – an “anti-Communist” concept which appeared in British intelligence reports . . . during the Crimean War of the nineteenth century!) has no other basis than geopolitics. But the West has grown too immoral to be cynical, and needs Russia to embody the (necessarily ideological) Evil – willy-nilly: if the Popovs don’t like their part in the movie, well, let’s just force it upon them. After all, the ever-increasing costs of media hegemony should also bring some return on the investment, right?
The bottom line of this messy paradox is that, as Mircea Eliade understood, there is no such thing as irreligious mankind, only religiously disturbed nations, which, as a consequence of that illness, quickly disappear – while often proving quite harmful to those around them during their agony. As the ludicrous controversy around the “Polish Holocaust” demonstrates, the truly religious feeling that both Polish PiS voters and New York liberals still have in common is that both the New Age Polish brand of re-invented, post-Communist Catholicism, as well as the shallow, East Coast atheism-cum-scientism of Hillary voters, follow the cult of victimhood. You cannot refuse the migrant invasion because it is racially alien and socially disastrous – but only in the name of some poor victimized European women (though all electoral statistics show that pro-migrant parties have a much wider feminine base throughout Europe).
Similarly, Holocaust victims are not, as the Christian saints once were, moral examples of selflessness: their life story does not need an element of assumed sacrifice (as in the case of some Warsaw ghetto heroes) to be religiously revered – in the deeply feminine worldview of the emasculated White World, all that is needed is (passive) suffering at the hands of Evil. Though economically occupied by the only European power which, at some point of history, did not make a secret of its intention to erase the Polish nation from the surface of its Lebensraum, and directly targeted by a license to kill by all the Soros stooges in Brussels, the PiS government, which would therefore need a pacified Poland-Russia relationship as much as oxygen to breathe, is too busy managing its own national victimized narrative in the form of cemetery vandalism and Holocaust-certified good conscience contests.
So, faced with a schizophrenic West, an autistic Russia, and a demented Poland, could hope take refuge in Hungary? Well, it could – provided we don’t forget for one single second that there is no such thing as “independent Hungary”: there is a small, economically dominated NATO country ruled by a largely apolitical FIDESZ full of potential traitors, who respect their charismatic leader mostly out of fear (of personal sanctions at the individual level, and of electoral annihilation at the party level – since the Hungarian people plebiscite their leader, not their leader’s party). All there is is Viktor Orbán, a lone fighter for Tradition, whose (political and/or physical) assassination has been on the globalists’ menu for quite a few years. Orbán, a few old friends (such as László Kövér and Zsolt Bayer) who became his lieutenants, the dream of a European Renaissance, and (perhaps) Orbán’s guardian angel. For the upcoming battle of Budapest, I’m afraid that’s all we have, folks.
Modeste Schwartz lives in Hungary and regularly writes for the Visegrád Post (in French and English), Gândește (in Romanian), and Geopolitika (in English and Russian). He specializes in political analysis and cultural critique, and is also a poet, folk dancer, and traveler. He maintains a Patreon account here.