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The “New State” in Portugal, Spain, & Greece:
Fascist in Style, but Not in Reality


Antonio De Oliveira Salazar of Portugal (left) and Francisco Franco of Spain (right).

5,449 words

Dimitris Michalopoulos is a Greek historian. The present paper observes the rules of the US Library of Congress for the transliteration of Greek names.

The case of Stefan Zweig is a well-known one. He was born in Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg Empire, in 1881. Being of Jewish stock, and thanks to his talent as well as the patronage of Theodor Herzl,[1] [2] he succeeded during the 1920s and ‘30s in becoming one of the most renowned authors throughout the world. Because of the rise of the German National Socialists, he abandoned his country and emigrated first to Great Britain, then to the United States, and eventually to Brazil, where he committed suicide in 194; he grew depressed because of the situation in Europe.

Before leaving the “Old Continent,” Zweig nonetheless had the chance to visit Spain; and he did so in the summer of 1936, i.e. when the Civil War was already raging. He was aboard an English vessel; to his great astonishment, the boat called at Vigo, in Galicia, although this city had been captured by Franco’s nationalist, indeed fascist, troops.[2] [3] Then, the oversensitive Zweig tried to find the solution to a problem that was unfolding before his very eyes: Who was arming and supplying the young peasants recruited by the fascists? And further: Why had a British vessel, i.e. one flying the flag of “democratic country,” put in at a port held by anti-democratic troops?[3] [4]

The Lusitanian Archetype

In the 1990s there were still people who had memories of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. During his Coimbra years, the future dictator was a “mild” royalist; still, after his accession to power, he practically dismissed any idea of the monarchy’s restoration:

In Coimbra, he was regarded as a monarchist, or at least sympathetic; that is why he was subject to political persecution and lost his job as professor. In the early days of his rule, nonetheless, he wanted to put the country in order; for it was ill-managed during the long periods of irresponsible demagoguery. Yet, from a certain moment onwards (perhaps from the 1933 Constitution), it seems that he began to take seriously the hybrid solution he had invented as Portugal’s constitutional framework.[4] [5]

It is noteworthy that an almost identical “hybrid solution” was to be implemented by Franco a couple of years later in Spain, chiefly as far as the question of Kingship was concerned.[5] [6]

Be that as it may, Salazar stated the main points of his policy at Braga on May 28, 1966:[6] [7]

The revolution of May 28 has inherited the consequences of the first Great War. [As a matter of fact] it suffered the harsh jolts of the economic crisis of the 1930s; it endured the . . . difficulties of the 1936-1939 Spanish War, and although in a position of neutrality in the 1939-1945 great World Conflict, it was beset by the limitations and dangers that ensued. During that period, our Atlantic islands and our overseas provinces had to be defended . . . [for] the official conception of Europe as to the destiny of the overseas territories, over which she exercised her sovereignty, coincided curiously with the policy of the subversive Powers. [As a result] the divergence of our concepts about the defense of the West has unleashed against us the most virulent, the largest, and the most persistent international campaign . . . In other words, if the [National Revolution of] May 28 was the beginning of a kind of national blessing, since the movement triumphed without tears or bloodshed . . . it had, at last, to carry out its work in the midst of constant dangers and difficulties . . . And further: In 1928, when I assumed the portfolio of Finance, there were two conflicting theses: One maintained that it was necessary to start with economic development, and to wait until financial equilibrium was achieved; and another professing that it was necessary to begin with financial equilibrium in order to have national enrichment founded on the finances’ stability and solidity. We gave priority to finances, and after years of hard work and severe administration, we were finally able to sweep away the ghosts that had darkened public life and paralyzed the action of the State. The eternal budget deficit and the imbalance of accounts; the defective constitution of the public debt; the vicious destination of the issues of paper money, channeled [always] towards the Treasury, in order to remedy its expenses; the flaws in the constitution and the use of floating debt; the actually usurious interest rates, the instability or [even] the of our currency’s exchange value; the discrediting of the [Portuguese] State on the financial markets; All of these are questions . . . today . . . definitely resolved. And since these questions are interlinked, it became clear that after [our] government’s credit was consolidated and the value of money stabilized, national savings immediately ceased to seek refuge in foreign markets. So, it was possible to start disposing of these savings to encourage the national economy; and that is why in the space of nearly thirty years we have been able to avoid recourse to external credit.

Keeping in mind Salazar’s apologia, it is easy to grasp the ideal physiognomy of the New State’s leader, not only in Portugal but on a global scale: a competent, skillful personality with vague political ideology. Such a character would soon be interested only in his personal position and power; as a result, he would speedily try to unify his compatriots under his own, actually “colorless,” authority, and thus be most effectual in the field of foreign policy – either opted for or dictated.

In fact, the case of Salazar may be regarded as a typical one. In spite of his peculiar, but not untrue, belief that raising the standard of the populace’s living brings about moral corruption and the prevalence of Left-wing ideologies,[7] [8] he remained so loyal to his country’s alliance with the United Kingdom that, as early as 1941, the leadership of the Wehrmacht did not rule out a German aggression against Portugal.[8] [9] The doutor considered, in fact, the Second World War as a “comedy”;[9] [10] and no sooner was he convinced that the United States and Great Britain did not menace Portugal’s territorial integrity than he grew warmer in his friendship towards the two liberal-democratic powers.[10] [11] And last but not least: It was under the aegis of Great Britain that the traditional adversity between Spain and Portugal was brought to an end;[11] [12] Salazar and Franco were henceforth free to admire each other.[12] [13]

2. Franco & Great Britain: The Engimatic Cyrpto-Sympathy

Before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Francisco Bahamonde Franco was nicknamed “Miss Islas Canarias” by his colleagues;[13] [14] for he was a valiant and competent army officer, but nothing more. In point of fact, he was an unpolitical personality.[14] [15] This is why Adolf Hitler had been so astonished by his ascendancy as to allegedly declare that “Franco was found at Spain’s top as Pontius Pilate in the Credo: none has ever realized how he did so.”[15] [16]

Let us leave aside the question of Pilate, because its solution is to be found in the syntax of Credo’s Greek text. As for Franco’s accession to power, nevertheless, the explanation lies in the death of three Spanish military leaders, namely Amado Balmes Alonso, José Sanjurjo, and Emilio Mola Vidal. The first among them was the temporary Governor of the Las Palmas district, in the Canary Islands; his accidental, unexpected death on July 16, 1936, gave Franco a good pretext for leaving Tenerife, where he was posted to guard it, and proceed to Las Palmas, from where the passage to Morocco was an easy one.[16] [17] The future Caudillo reached Africa on a British plane,[17] [18] and there the Brigadier General of the Air Force, Alfredo Kindelán Duany, a notorious Anglophile, instructed him in how to organize the first airlift in history, thanks to which the well-trained troops of Spanish Morocco proceeded from Africa to Europe.[18] [19]

Whatever the facts of the matter, the point is that after Alonso, it was José Sanjurjo and Emilio Mola Vidal’s turns to die. The former was the so-to-speak traditional leader of the military uprising in Spain;[19] [20] yet, he perished in July 1936 in a mysterious air crash[20] [21] before formally assuming his duties.[21] [22] Mola, moreover, who was popular in Spain’s traditionalist areas,[22] [23] and who was the one who practically assumed the burden of organizing the 1936 insurrection[23] [24] and secured the restoration of the old, monarchist Spanish two-color flag,[24] [25] died in 1937, in another mysterious air accident.[25] [26] And so Franco was found at the top of Nationalist Spain first[26] [27] and of the whole of Spain afterward, thanks to the initiative of another general, namely Miguel Cabanellas, the theoretical leader of the Junta de Defensa Nacional, who was coordinating the Nationalist armies[27] [28] – and who was a notorious Freemason as well.[28] [29] It is very important to bear in mind that Cabanellas had been motivated to elevate Franco to Nationalist Spain’s supreme leadership by Kindelán.[29] [30]

Still, it was not enough. Franco needed to be assisted in many ways. The British government, therefore, was not late in recognizing the military that had risen up against the Spanish Republic as belligerents, though, legally speaking, they were just “rebels”;[30] [31] and accordingly, the British authorities embargoed all weapon sales to both of the “belligerents.”[31] [32] It goes without saying that such an embargo was to the Republican government’s detriment; for the “Reds” lacked weapons, whilst their foes did not.[32] [33] It is noteworthy, nevertheless, that, because of pressure exerted by the French government, the British declared later that they did not recognize the Nationalist government.[33] [34] Yet in practice, the United Kingdom maintained the embargo of weapon sales to the Spanish, either “Nationalists or Reds”;[34] [35] and doing so, British diplomacy continued to favor the Francoists.[35] [36]

Be that as it may, the Francoist government was officially recognized by the United Kingdom only in February 1939.[36] [37] Still, such a retardation was all eyewash; for, in practice and despite the protests from various sides, Franco’s Nationalists were always regarded as “belligerents” by the UK government.[37] [38]

In short and paradoxical as it may appear, Francisco Franco’s Estado Nuevo[38] [39] was not a fascist one.[39] [40] For neither the Falange, after the death of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and the imprisonment of Manuel Hedilla Larrey, or the Carlistas had an actual political role.[40] [41] One should always have in mind the unforgettable aphorism of Franco:

I am here, because I do not understand anything about politics and I am not a politician. This is my secret. [41] [42]

That is why, in the spring of 1939, the British minister at Madrid was stating Urbi et orbi that, in the imminent World War, Spain was to be neutral.[42] [43] Franco himself, moreover, had declared his strictly neutralist intentions as early as 1936, in a talk he had with Philippe Pétain, Marshal of France.[43] [44] What is more, in July 1939, Franco categorically refused Spain’s alliance with the Axis Powers;[44] [45] and accordingly, a couple of weeks later, he had one of the recompenses he had in view. A loan of a billion pesetas was going to be offered to Spain by France and Great Britain.[45] [46] Given that, nonetheless, the two democratic powers could not aid a “fascist” country, the money was first given to Portugal and then forwarded to Spain by the Salazar administration under the façade of a Portuguese loan.[46] [47] The obligation that Franco had to observe was the neutrality of his country in the imminent world war.[47] [48] And that clearly benefitted the Allies more than the Axis Powers.[48] [49]

3. The 1940-41 Greco-Italian Deictic Peripety

The hostilities between Greece and Italy that started late in October 1940, and which were ended by the occupation of Greece by the Axis powers in spring the following year, is still regarded as an “unprovoked aggression” of Fascist Italy against “an innocent Balkan country.” And yet rudimentary research into the relevant Greek documents leads to a totally different conclusion. If truth be told, Greece was – from the year 1936 onward – the ally of Great Britain. The following document[49] [50] is revealing: in the event of a war between the United Kingdom and Italy, Greece was going to side “unconditionally” with the British. It is necessary, therefore, to cite some extracts from that crucial document:

* * *


Most Secret

It will be recollected that early in December last His Majesty’s Government asked the Hellenic Government for assurances of their support, under the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, in the event of an attack by Italy on any Power fulfilling her obligations under that instrument, and that the Hellenic Government returned a very definite reply in the sense that Greece would unhesitatingly meet all her obligations. In particular, the Hellenic Government were asked to afford facilities to the Royal Navy – on the supposition that Great Britain should prove the victim of the aggression visualized for the use of harbours, docks and repair facilities; on these points equally firm assurances were given.

The Naval Attaché has now been instructed to make further enquiries, on the same hypothesis, namely that Italy takes offensive action against Great Britain while the latter is acting in accordance with her obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant – but it is particularly desired to emphasize that His Majesty’s Government do not consider that this contingency is at present likely. It may, in fact, be said that the present inquiries may fairly be regarded as the logical continuation of the original exchange of views.

It is also desired to emphasize that the preparation of detailed plans for international cooperation is not at the moment suggested. The inquiries which the Naval Attaché has been directed to make are as follows:

A. Use of Harbours

The principal initial requirement of the British Fleet under the circumstances visualized will probably be the use of certain secluded harbours for the refueling of destroyers since it is to be assumed that in at least the early stages, war will be waged in the Eastern Mediterranean. It will evidently be of importance that such movements, i.e. those of the oilers themselves and those of the vessels refueling for them (an operation which probably will be performed and completed during the night) should be veiled in the maximum secrecy. Will it, therefore, be possible for the Hellenic Government that any reports to Athens from Customs or other officials shall be treated as highly confidential and withheld from the public?

Later, the use of better-known harbours (such as for example Salamis) might be desired, mainly for light craft and auxiliaries, particularly if defensive arrangements can be provided early in hostilities. Such cooperation would evidently fall within the scope of the assurances already given, while the maintenance of secrecy would be facilitated by the working of the general censorship which, presumably, will be imposed.

B. Repair Facilities

Salamis is well-known too for its capacity to maintain a small Navy in an efficient state, and assurances are therefore requested that urgent repair work for the British Fleet would be unhesitatingly be undertaken and that every effort would be made by the use of day and night labour and by the enrolling of such additional workmen as are available in Greece to expedite the work to the fullest extent. It might even be desired to send labour from British yards to assist in the work, in which case it is hoped that every effort would be made to ensure the cordial cooperation of the employers of the Hellenic Government and that arrangements for their accommodation and victualling would be placed at the disposal of the Royal Navy.

The use of facilities existing at the Piraeus, which are in the hands of private firms, is a further matter for consideration. Presumably, no objection would be raised to the British Government entering into contacts with these firms, or, alternatively, does the Hellenic Government contemplate enrolling them in some scheme of national service on the outbreak of war? In this latter case, the situation would then presumably be the same as that of Salamis as visualized above. An expression of opinion as to the value of the Piraeus resources would be welcome.

C. Active cooperation of the Hellenic Navy

It is to be assumed that since the giving of the original assurances in December, the role of the Hellenic naval forces in the event of war has been receiving the attention of the Ministry of Marine, and that action is in progress to bring the Fleet quickly to a state of maximum efficiency.

It will be recollected that shortly after his arrival in Athens, the Naval Attaché, with the concurrence of His Majesty’s Minister, formulated a series of questions regarding the then state of the Hellenic Navy, and that the Ministry of Marine was kind enough to furnish the information desired. It is now requested that these original question may be reviewed and the answers brought up today, particularly to:

  1. Manning
  2. State of readiness.
  3. Training.

D. Material

The stores most in demand in the event under discussion would probably be anti-submarine nets, mines, depth charges and mining-sweeping equipment. Information is required as to the position in these respects, with particular reference to the reported shortage of T.N.T. for mine and depth charge filling, the construction of nets, and the provision of mine-sweeping gear. In connection with the latter, what is the progress in training, and to what extent is it considered that effective mines sweeping, either by naval craft or by auxiliaries could now be undertaken?

a. Operational

What is the general idea of the Ministry of Marine as to the employment of the Hellenic Naval forces under the circumstances postulated? What are considered to be the present operational capabilities of (i) the Destroyer flotilla and (ii) the Submarine flotilla?

E. Recognition

What systems are now in force for the interchange of recognition signals by day and by night between:

i. Two surface vessels or submarines on the surface.

ii. A surface vessel and a submerged submarine.

iii. A surface vessel (or a shore authority) and an approaching merchant vessel.

F. Defence of Bases

Has any progress been made since the replies to the earlier questions were drafted, and has the special committee appointed for the study of the subject arrived at any conclusions or recommendations?

Have any additional A. A. defences been installed at, for example, Salamis island? What is the estimated efficiency of the A. A. defence system on Lipso [sic] island? Have, for example, satisfactory firings been carried out against a towered aerial target?

G, Trade Protection

In the circumstances under consideration, it is possible that important traffic to and from the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, in general, may require organization and protection, particularly in the case of passages through the area adjacent to the Italian bases in the Dodecanese. In this event, it would probably be necessary to institute a Naval Control Service, as developed in the Great War, at Salonica and Athens, in which work the cooperation of the Hellenic Navy with the Royal Navy would be of great value. A combined Control Staff might be formed, to include persons with local knowledge of shipping requirements and conditions, provided with suitable office and clerical assistance. Assurances of these facilities and of cooperation in the institution and conduct of such an organization are requested.

British Legation, Athens

8th February 1936

* * *

The accession of Iōannēs Metaxas (1871-1941) to power occurred gradually during the spring and the summer of 1936. On April 13 of that year he was appointed Prime Minister by King George II; and a couple of months later, on August 4, 1936, he was invested by the Sovereign with dictatorial powers.

Unlike Salazar and Franco, Metaxas did have a clear-cut political ideology. He was, in fact, a brilliant Engineering officer who, during the First World War, advocated Greece’s neutrality. If truth be told, he was an undisguised Germanophile; given, nonetheless, that Greece was not able to make war on the Entente Powers (Great Britain, France, and Russia), he had adopted a neutralist stance. As a result, he came into open conflict with Eleutherios Venizelos, who was Greece’s Prime Minister by then and an ardent Anglophile; and that very antagonism resulted in the so-called 1916-1917 “Greek National Schism,” i.e. the foundation of two Greek statehoods, one neutralist and pro-German in the Peloponnese and Mainland Greece, and another in Macedonia, pro-Entente, with Salonika as capital city.[50] [51]

In order to fight the pro-Entente “liberal plutocrats,” Metaxas organized the Epistratoi (Army Reservists) combat groups, that might be regarded as the first fascist units in Europe.[51] [52] Those Epistratoi succeeded in repulsing the Entente troops that tried to capture Athens in November 1916. Yet in the spring of the following year, due to the pusillanimity of Constantine, King of Greece, who just like Metaxas was neutralist and Germanophile but who preferred, under pressure from the French, to abandon Greece and fly to Switzerland, Greece was “unified” under Venizelos’ leadership, and then declared war on Germany and her allies.

Nonetheless, Metaxas survived, and in the 1920s he entered the arena of politics. He founded his own political party, the Eleutherophronōn (Free Thinkers one), but he did not manage to come to power. Still, after the collapse of the First Greek Republic (1922-1935) and the restoration of the monarchy in the person of King George II of Greece, his luck changed. Paradoxical as it may appear, it was the British political leadership that backed regime change in Greece, though George II was reputed to be a Germanophile; and it was the United Kingdom’s political leadership that favoured – indeed, provoked – Metaxas’ accession to power.

As proved by the document already cited, shortly before Metaxas’ accession to the Premiership, the Greek territorial waters were put under British control; and almost simultaneously all of his actual or potential antagonists died “accidentally”[52] [53] (just as had happened with Franco in Spain). It goes without saying that Metaxas did not change Greece’s Anglophilic orientation.[53] [54] Quite the contrary, as soon as he was invested with dictatorial powers, and despite his “fascist” style and methods, he disposed of every pro-German nucleus within the government machinery and the Army.[54] [55] Simultaneously, the “radical differences” between Metaxas’ regime and those of Hitler and Mussolini were publicly highlighted.[55] [56] Yet the real point is by no means the contrast between the “fascist” look of Metaxas and his pro-British orientation. As a matter of fact, the crux is that he knew very well already in 1936 that a fresh world conflict was imminent,[56] [57] that Greece would stand by Great Britain and her allies,[57] [58] and most of all he realized, as early as the autumn of 1940, Germany’s defeat and Dodecanese’s annexation by Greece.[58] [59] And this very prognostication resulted, during the winter of 1940-1941, in the Greco-Italian conflict, where 500,000 Greek troops fought against 100,000 Italians in Northern Epirus and Southern Albania.[59] [60]

Whatever the facts of the matter, the similarities between Metaxas’ prognostications and Franco’s are surprising, for the Caudillo had predicted already in 1937 that the British Empire would be dissolved as a result of the parliamentary regime.[60] [61] He was the first, moreover, to describe – even if indirectly – Hitler and Mussolini as “mad,” even though the latter followed him,[61] [62] and he likewise gave the word “holocaust” the ideological and political burden it currently has.[62] [63]

Conclusions: Pseudo-fascist regimes & the Mackinder doctrine

Τhere have been three cases of the implementation of the “New State” regime in Europe shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War: in Portugal, Spain, and Greece. In point of fact, the official name of the Francoist regime was Estado Nuevo, and that of Metaxas’ was Neon Kratos (New State)[63] [64]. It goes without saying, therefore, that they had some characteristics in common, namely:

  1. A fully fascist aspect, for instance the famous “fascist salutes” (mainly in Greece and Spain).
  2. In spite of their fascist aspect, they enjoyed British support.
  3. They did not aim at mobilizing the people, but at making them politically inert. The famous Falange Española Tradicionalista y de la JONS (FET y de las JONS) neutralized in practice the Falange of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and of Manuel Hedilla;[64] [65] Salazar’s União Nacional was simply the decorative framework, so to speak, of Salazar’s authority; and Metaxas dissolved the Komma Eleutherophronōn (Free Thinkers’ Party), i.e. his own one, upon his accession to power.
  4. During the Second World War, they favored the Axis’ enemies. Greece, moreover, thanks to her victory against the Italians, became something of a beacon of resistance against fascism.
  5. The three “New State” countries openly favored the Jews, whether they were persecuted or not. The Metaxas years was the golden age of Greece’s Jewish community. Franco, moreover, tacitly revoked the 1492 Edict of the Catholic Monarchs expelling the Jews, and Salazar not only did not oppress the Jews still living in Portugal but offered them shelter from the German National Socialists.[65] [66]

This last point requires particular attention. Today it is beyond question that Metaxas was of Jewish stock,[66] [67] and there are few doubts that even Franco was as well.[67] [68] This is why the question of “What was the role that those pseudo-fascist, ‘New State’ regimes played on the world chessboard?” becomes more acute.

The answer is to be found in the Mackinder doctrine.

Contrary to what is generally believed, Russia was not broken up after the Communists seized the power. Quite the contrary! Stalin, in fact, proved to be more “Russian” that the Romanov Emperors themselves.[68] [69] The rise of the Communist parties in Spain, Greece, and Portugal therefore meant that the Soviet Union – i.e. Russia – could gain access to the Mediterranean Sea. Nevertheless, Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), one of the founders of the London School of Economics, delivered a lecture in 1904 at the Royal Geographic Society in London entitled “The Geographical Pivot of History” in which he explained that, if the powers occupying the “Heartland of Eurasia” were able to have approaches to the “warm seas,” they would ipso facto become “candidates” for “world domination.”[69] [70] That is why Salazar, Franco, and Metaxas were backed by the liberal, democratic powers of the West and remained faithful to them.[70] [71] The three dictators were “fascists” in appearance only, and it is well-known that appearances are often deceptive . . .


[1] [72] Stefan Zweig (Jean-Paul Zimmerman, tr.), Der Weg von Gestern (Paris: Albin Michel, 1948), pp. 125-136.

[2] [73] Ibid., p. 459.

[3] [74] Ibid., pp. 459-460.

[4] [75] Em Coimbra, era considerado monárquico, ou pelo menos simpatizante, e por isso também em certo momento foi objecto de perseiguiçã política e demitido de professor. Nos primeiros tempos de governo, procurou ordenar o país, mal gerido por largos tempos de demagogía pouco responsável. E, a partir de certa altura (talvez a partir da Constitução de 1933), parece que passou a tomar a sério a solução híbrida que havía preparado para o texto constitucional. See Jacinto Ferreira, Ao serviço da Pátria e do Rei. Memórias políticas, 1926-1974 (Lisbon, 1991), p. 18. (The quotation has been freely translated from Portuguese to English by the author.)

[5] [76] Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Greece (hereafter: AYE), 1939,Α/13/2, Periklēs Iak. Argyropoulos, Greek minister plenipotentiary, to Iōannēs Metaxas, Premier and Foreign Minister of Greece, cable No 731, San Sebastian, May 8, 1939.

[6] [77] AYE, 1966, 12.10, Secretariado Nacional da Informação. « Discours prononcé par le Président du Conseil, Docteur Oliveira Salazar, à Braga, le 28 mai 1966 ». (Handcopied by the author.)

[7] [78] Dominique de Roux, Le cinquième Empire (Paris: Pierre Belfond, 1977), p. 272.

[8] [79] AYE, KY, 1941, 8. 4, Kimōn A. Kollas, Greek minister plenipotentiary at Lisbon, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, cipher cable No 658, Lisbon, April 22, 1941; the same to the same, dispatch No 1014/Α, Lisbon, September 27, 1941.

[9] [80] AYE, KY, 1941, 8. 4, K. A. Kollas to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, cipher cable No 658, Lisbon, April 22, 1941

[10] [81] AYE, 1946, 78.2, G. Argyropoulos, chargé d’affaires of the Greek legation at Lisbon, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 368/Α, Lisbon, June 8, 1946.

[11] [82] Ibid.

[12] [83] See for instance Franco’s statement concerning Salazar: El hombre de Estado más completo, más respectable . .. . . .: Salazar. He aquí un personaje extraordinario Su único defecto es tal vez la modestía. (Paul Preston, Las tres Españas del 36 [Debols!llo, 2003], pp. 64-65.)

[13] [84] Pío Moa, Los mitos de la Guerra Civil (Madrid: La esfera de los libros, 2004), p. 181.

[14] [85] Javier Tusell, Franco en la Guerra Civil: Una biografía política (Barcelona: Tusquets Editores, 2006), pp. 18, 39, 41.

[15] [86] Author’s talks with officials of the Francoist regime late in the 1980s.

[16] [87] Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, vol. I. Translated to Greek by Alikē Geōrgoulē and Takēs Mendrakos (Athens: Tolidēs, 1971), p. 225. Cf. https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amado_Balmes [88] (retrieved on July 21, 2018).

[17] [89] https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_D.H.89_Dragon_Rapide [90] (retrieved on July 21, 2018).

[18] [91] Pío Moa, Los mitos de la Guerra Civil, p. 219 (note).

[19] [92] Javier Tusell, pp.29, 32.

[20] [93] See the newspaper El Socialista (Madrid), July 21, 1936, p. 3.

[21] [94] Luis Romero, L’aube de la guerre d’Espagne. Translated to French by Daniel A. Toledano (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969), pp. 472-475.

[22] [95] Josep Carles Clemente, Los Carlistas (Madrid: Ediciones Istmo, 1990), p. 170.

[23] [96] Javier Tusell, p. 30.

[24] [97] Ibid, p. 29.

[25] [98] Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, vol. II. Translated to Greek by Alikē Geōrgoulē (Athens: Tolidēs, 1971), p. 221.

[26] [99] Ibid. The ceremony took place on October 1, 1936 (día del Caudillo). (AYE, 1939, Α/13/2, Per. Iak. Argyropoulos to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 1032, San Sebastian, Οctober 5, 1939.)

[27] [100] See the newspaper El Norte de Castilla (Valladolid), July 24, 1936, p. 1.

[28] [101] César Vidal, Los Masones. La sociedad segreta más influente en la Historia (Barcelona: Planeta, 2006), p. 367; Pío Moa, Los mitos de la Guerra Civil, p. 562; Alfredo Semprún, El crimen que desató la Guerra Civil (Barcelona : Debols!llo, 2006), p. 115.

[29] [102] Javier Tusell, p. 70.

[30] [103] AYE, 1936, 1. 1, Charalampos Simopoulos, Greek minister plenipotentiary at London, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 2287/St/36, London, August 31, 1936.

[31] [104] AYE, 1936, 1. 1, Ch. Simopoulos to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 2614/St/36, London, October 8, 1936.

[32] [105] Ibid.

[33] [106] AYE, 1936, 56. 3, Sp. N. Marketēs, Greek minister plenipotentiary at Paris, to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 3853, Paris, November 26, 1936.

[34] [107] Ibid.

[35] [108] Cf. Javier Tusell, p. 251.

[36] [109] AYE, 1939, A/13/2, Ch. Simopoulos to I. Metaxas, dispatch No 749/St/39, London, March 2, 1939.

[37] [110] Fernando Díaz-Plaja, La Guerra de España en sus documentos (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 19727), p. 234.

[38] [111] Josep Carles Clemente, Los Carlistas, p. 170.

[39] [112] Cf. Ronald Radosh, Mary R. Habeck, Grigory Sebastianov (eds.), Spain Betrayed. The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War (Yale University Press, 2001), p. 97, document No 27.

[40] [113] AYE, 1939, Α/13/2, , Per. Iak. Argyropoulos to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 8779, San Sebastian, July of 1939; Josep Carles Clemente, Los Carlistas, p. 170.

[41] [114] Estoy aquí porque no entiendo de política ni soy un político. Éste es mi secreto. See P. Preston, Las tres Españas del 36, p. 46.

[42] [115] AYE, 1939, Α/13/2, Per. Iak. Argyropoulos to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, cable No 711, San Sebastian, April 18, 1939.

[43] [116] Javier Tusell, pp. 251-252.

[44] [117] AYE, 1939, Α/13/2, Per. Iak. Argyropoulos to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 8779, San Sebastian, July of 1939; the Greek minister plenipotentiary of Greece at Budapest to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 1155/D/4, Budapest, July 28, 1939.

[45] [118] AYE, 1939, Α/13/2, Per. Iak. Argyropoulos to the Foreign Ministry of Greece, dispatch No 906, San Sebastian, August 17, 1939.

[46] [119] Ibid.

[47] [120] Ibid.

[48] [121] Pío Moa, Contra la mentira (Barcelona : Debolsillo, 2006), p. 207.

[49] [122] AYE, 1935, A. A. K., 7. (Document hand-copied by the author.)

[50] [123] The detailed account in Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, Ho Ethnikos Dichasmos. Hē allē diastase (The [Greek] National Schism. The unseen dimension), Athens: “Pelasgos”, 20122.

[51] [124]Dēmētrēs Michalopoulos, Hē Xechasmenē Epanastasē. Hoi Hellēnes Epistratoi kai ho Agōnas tous, 1916-1920 (Forgotten Revolution. The Greek Reservists and their Struggle, 1916-1920), Athens: “Pelasgos”, 20142.

[52] [125] See for instance Kōnstantinos Loulēs, Hē epiviōsē tēs Helladas mesa apo diadochika thaumata. Selides akmēs kai parakmēs tēs Hellēnikēs Historias (Greece’s Survival through Successive Miracles. Greek History’s Pages of Prosperity and Decline), Athens: “Psychogios”, 20189, p. 126.

[53] [126] AYE, 1940, A. 9, I. Metaxas to Nikolaos Politēs, Greek minister plenipotentiary at Paris, cipher cable No 12002/Α, Athens, May 2, 1940.

[54] [127] Annivas Veliadēs, Metaxas-Hitler: Hellēnogermanikes scheseis stēn Metaxikē diktatoria, 1936-1941 (Metaxas and Hitler. The Greek-German Relations during Metaxas’ Dictatorship, 1936-1941), Athens: “Enalios”, 2003.

[55] [128] D. Kallonas, Iōannēs Metaxas (Athens, 1938), p. 192.

[56] [129] Epameinondas P. Kavvadias, Ho nautikos polemos tou 1940 hopōs ton ezēsa (The 1940 Naval War as I lived it), Athens: “Pyrsos”, 1950, pp. 103-104.

[57] [130] Ibid., p. 104.

[58] [131] I. Metaxas. To prosōpiko tou hēmerologio (The Diary of I. Metaxas), vol. IV, p. 524.

[59] [132] Geniko Epiteleio Stratou. Dieuthynsis Historias Stratou, Ho hellēnoitalikos polemos, 1940-1941. Hē italikē eisvolē, apo 28 Oktōvriou mechri 13 Noemvriou 1940 (The General Staff. Department of Military History, The Greco-Italian War, 1940-1941. The Italian Aggression, from October 28 to November 13, 1941), Athens, 1986, p. 5.

[60] [133] Fernando Díaz-Plaja, p. 357.

[61] [134] Ibid., p. 355.

[62] [135] Ibid., p. 296.

[63] [136] D. Kallonas, Iōannēs Metaxas, p. 187.

[64] [137] Fernando Díaz-Plaja, pp. 285-288. M. Hedilla, moreover, was sentenced to death por conspirer contra la seguridad del Estado (ibid., p. 337).

[65] [138] See mainly the book by Avraham Milgram, Portugal, Salazar e os judeus. Translated into Portuguese by Lúcia Liba Mucznik, Lisbon: Gradiva, 2010.

[66] [139] In February 1941, i.e. a couple of weeks after I. Metaxas died, a memorial service took place for him in the Yeshurum Synagogue, Jerusalem, by the Chief Rabbi Ben Zion Ouriel. (Chronika [Chronicles], Organ of the Central Israelite Council of Greece, No 118 [November-December 1991], p. 3. )

[67] [140] Victor Malka, Les Juifs Sépharades (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France/Que sais-je? 19973), pp. 32-33.

[68] [141] See for instance the book by Iōn Vorres, Hē teleutaia tōn Tsarōn (The Last of the Czars), Athens: Anglo-Hellenic Publishers, 1985.2 It concerns the memories of Olga, sister of Emperor Nicholas II, who survived and spent the rest of her life in Canada.

[69] [142] Orestēs E. Vidalēs, To synchrono geōpoltiko mas perivallon kai hē ethnikē mas politikē (Our Contemporary Geopolitical Environment and the National Policy of Greece), Athens: Hellēikē Euroekdotikē, 1988, p. 23ff.

[70] [143] As for British public opinion’s sympathy with Franco, see, for instance Fernando Díaz-Plaja, p. 49.