Part 5 of 5
PLOTS OR POPULAR ACTION
Behind the Times
The example of the Gaullist plots, the systematic terrorism of the FLN or of the IRA in Ireland, has appealed to a number of “nationals.” It is easier to copy the past than to imagine the future. Anachronism in politics, as in the military field, ensures defeat; one cannot conduct trench warfare in the age of tanks.
Certain images have caused great damage in the past. The Spanish Civil War, the national insurrection of 1936 around the army. May 13 and the military pseudo-revolt. The appeal to the soldiers, so dear to the “nationals.” The French army is one of the components of the régime; its chiefs have been carefully chosen for their self-interested submission, its cadres are, in majority, simple functionaries, but not the army with a capital A. That will only be good for helping the enterprise of patching up the régime.
It is through lack of self-confidence and rejection of effort that the “nationals” have discharged their responsibilities on the blind hope of imaginary military plots. It is intellectual cowardice, a false excuse to escape from the patient and difficult tasks of the militants.
A Thousand Revolutionary Cadres
Popular consent, no more than street action, is not sufficient to assure the success of the revolution in a technically developed society. There is no power without the control, from the interior, of the technical mechanisms that ensure the functioning of a modern State. The extreme complexity of the High Administration, its covert power, and its colonization by the caste of technocrats make it a world apart, impenetrable, and all-powerful. Only the presence in these mechanisms of revolutionary cadres, even in very small numbers, will allow it to be neutralized and to yield to the nationalist will. Certain public services of vital interest for the functioning of the country, infiltrated by the technocrats and the communists, are within the same framework of concerns.
In the open, as the standard-bearer of Nationalism, the political movement itself will have the task of publicly speaking to the people and winning them over. It will utilize, according to the necessities of the hour, all the legal means of propaganda and action. Built on a hierarchical corps of cadres and educated militants, organized on a cellular basis, both territorial and professional, it will appeal for widespread support.
In overt or covert liaison with the political movement, the “bases” will be progressively organized. As explained above, the purpose of the “bases” is to handle and control a specific milieu by way of social as well as political action, the adversaries being eliminated and the neutrals absorbed. This work will give birth to diverse associations adapted to the selected milieus. It will rest entirely on the Nationalist cadres, specialized and capable of looking after the organization.
Penetrating the mechanisms of the State, the political movement and popular bases will be the principal branches of the Nationalist Organization. They will be built on a corps of cadres, hierarchical, specialized, present in all the social organizations, connected to a centralized direction of collegial form. The organization will thus be capable of orchestrating the same campaign throughout the country and in all its aspects. It will be able to maneuver with discipline and promptness in the battle. Cadres and militants in the people will be like the yeast in the dough. A thousand élite revolutionary cadres will give victory to Nationalism.
ON THE SCALE OF THE WEST
An Exterior Lung
During all the time following April 22, 1961, the action in favor of French Algeria received a permanent and active support from various groups of Nationalist tendencies in Europe and even the United States. For the first time, an effective solidarity united Westerners over the frontiers.
The propaganda means of these groups were mobilized in order to support the action conducted in France. Newspapers, brochures, conferences, meetings, demonstrations, support committees adopted the same watchword in all languages.
Several Nations became, in some way, the exterior lungs of the French resistance, allowing it to regain its breath. Working groups were set up. The lodging of fugitive partisans was organized. The régime understood the danger. It intervened on the diplomatic level to stop support for the French combatants and to repress acts of solidarity.
Solidarity and Orchestration
Faced with the permanent plot of the liberal régimes and the international communist organization, the Nationalists of the West must not only persevere in this way, but also increase the action and perfect the method. The militants of the European Nation must find outside their frontiers support for a propaganda that explains their combat, exalts their courage, denounces the repression and the brutality of which they are victims, and awakens the sentiment of a common combat of the European peoples for their survival against those who want to enslave them.
The expansion of these initiatives must allow a true orchestration around a very simple central theme: struggle against communism and against all those who support it.
Through highly diverse channels—the press, circles of students, unions, members of parliament, political movements, cultural associations, ex-servicemen, youth organizations, committees of intellectuals—a vigorous counterattack could be conducted against the Soviet enterprises and those who indirectly support them. Such as an event susceptible of demonstrating the collusion of the liberal régime and communism, such as others capable of arousing popular indignation, could be immediately displayed and pinned down, everywhere and at the same moment. A coordinating body leaving to everybody their freedom of action will have to collect information and distribute it for purposes of exploitation.
The entry of the youth into the political combat, the influence of struggles conducted in France, the new problems, have accelerated the need for a new definition of Nationalist ideology as a doctrine of the Young Europe. The numerous contacts, the exchanges of ideas, the joint conferences have displayed a convergence of the conceptions of all the European militants.
The last few years, which are an incomparable source of education for the Nationalists of France, appear at the same time as an unparalleled experience offered to the Nationalists of Europe. Here is forged a method adapted to the new conditions of struggle. In the positive critique undertaken by the French militants, the European combatants will find the lessons that will guide their action.
To commence, it is necessary to create the conditions for a new, popular, and resolutely legal action. From this perspective, the last after-effects of the OAS, which from now on is a powerful asset of the régime, must be eliminated because they are harmful.
It is important to develop everywhere and at all levels the positive critique of the previous action, to work collectively for a new definition of Nationalism. It is necessary to speak, to write, to explain, to request the opening of the national opposition press for this work. All opportunities must be grasped and personal works must be inspired by this concern and this need.
The action of propaganda must be pursued so as to maintain the presence and permanent explanation of Nationalism. Crying over the past or practicing a policy of resentment would be contrary to the goal pursued. The responsibility for the abandonment of Algeria lies, not with a misled people, but with the régime and the politicians (civilian and military) who directed the “national” combat.
In the same way, it is necessary to maintain contact with all sincere partisans. To aid those who have suffered. To be actively present beside our refugee compatriots from Algeria and not leave the initiative solely to the forces of the régime.
This transitional period must be put to good use for a in-depth work so as to prepare for the time when the militants, formerly dispersed, will get together so as to set up the Nationalist Organization, define its program, and begin the fight.
No, the plots do not solve anything, they are harmful. The plotters resemble the old maids who meet to vent their spleen and their venomous feelings. Salon plotters or terrorists, they cut themselves off from their compatriots. They take a misunderstood mentality, become bad-tempered, and resentment dominates them. They thus move away permanently from Nationalism and victory.
It is not the means utilized, but the goals that characterize a revolutionary organization. The means, by themselves, are dependent on the circumstances. Thus, the Bolshevik party used illegality and violence, whereas the National Socialist party, also a revolutionary organization, used solely legal means to conquer power.
Extravagance in expression, the promise of Apocalypse, has never made Nationalism advance by one step, on the contrary. The adversary finds easy arguments, the people go away from men who appear like dangerous fools, the partisans are discouraged or become deformed in their turn.
The theatrical revolutionaries, in their remarks, their attitude, and their action, are enemies of the revolution. In particular, the young elements should be on their guard. Dressing in a costume called a uniform, confusing sectarianism with intransigence, displaying gratuitous violence, are infantile practices. Some would find the exaltation of a morbid romanticism here. The revolution is neither a fancy dress ball nor an outlet for mythomaniacs. Revolutionary action is not the occasion for an increase in purism.
Bases in the People
The action aims to enlighten the people intoxicated by the powerful propaganda of the régime, to propound the nationalist ideal, and to organize for victory. This is why priority is given to propaganda. Directed at the masses, this action must be strictly legal.
Working among the people is not a privilege of communism. It only needs a suitable method. Systematic and patient penetration, it will cover the most varied aspects. The discontent of workers in a company against the official unions, the revolt of the badly housed in a district, the concentration of refugees from North Africa in a high density block of flats, an opening in a local federation of farmers, a student guild, the elections in a favorable municipality, an instruction center of the army, a professional school, here are so many opportunities to progressively form, with perseverance and perfect adaptation to their milieu, nationalist “bases.” The teacher, the engineer, the officer, the unionist, Nationalist militants, everybody will be in their milieu the potential organizers of these “bases.”
The organization of such bases in popular milieus implies a specialization of work and the concentration of the efforts of all on a few points chosen after a thorough analysis of the chances and the means to be employed. Better to control in all of France only one company, only one municipality, only one university faculty, than to deploy a generalized agitation without any hold over the masses. These strongholds of Nationalism will become by example its best assets of propaganda. They will be schools of militants and organizers who, in their turn, will pursue their work in other milieus.
It is a long and exacting action without glory and without panache. It is a painstaking action. But only this action will prove to be effective.
CRAFT INDUSTRY OR EFFECTIVENESS
At the origin of the Nationalist combat, the scattering of initiatives and the weakness of the initial means concentrated on a very small number of militants the totality of the tasks. What was necessary during the first stage becomes catastrophic when the organization develops. A few organizers are overburdened by innumerable activities, each of which is as necessary as the rest. Around them, it is the custom to rely on them for everything. For fear of seeing a task poorly executed by a new member, the organizer continues to do everything by himself. The spirit of initiative disappears and with it the taste for action. The militants of value see themselves relegated to basic duties; they lose their faith and their dynamism.
In this craft industry stage, everybody must know how to do everything and nobody is responsible for anything in particular. The personal abilities of militants are ignored. Craft industry work leads to an extraordinary loss of energy and quality. Thus, one saw an excellent economic journalist, well connected in the United States, charged with distributing the circulars of the OAS in post offices. He was arrested in the course of one of these operations that young partisans, high school students or others, could have accomplished in his place, when nobody could replace him in his specialty, where his utility should have appeared obvious.
The overwhelmed organizer, like the unused militant, concur in the same sentiment of ineffectiveness and disgust. The one and the other are conscious of working in a vacuum.
The proven militants exist in sufficient numbers for the future Nationalist Organization to refuse craft industry work that will result in suffocation.
Division of Labor and Centralization
The variety of the activities of the Organization, the diversity of the milieus that it must penetrate, the overt and covert character of the struggle, imposes a division of labor that must go, in certain cases, up to compartmentalization. This division by branches of activity, entrusted to proven officials, is logically accompanied by a single and centralized command at the top.
Within each branch of activity, the division of labor and the specialization of members must be practiced equally. The local organizations must be able to be devoted with the maximum of effectiveness for the action, the centralization and the specialization of tasks should give them the possibility. To take an example, the one for propaganda should be able to rapidly supply material adapted to local groups, rather than craft industry initiatives powerless to struggle against adverse propaganda.
Through its militants, the Organization must be present everywhere, including inside the adversary. The presence of militants in certain economic and administrative mechanisms can be of infinitely superior utility than their participation in the activities of an activist group. The struggle does not take a single form. This is why the division of labor must be equally applied at the level of local organizations. The members must be the active elements of a common work, responsible for specific tasks, and not simply executing orders. On this condition, effective militants, organizers, and cadres will be formed.